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Abstract
For the stable roommates problem recently a new concept, exchange stability, was introduced.
In this paper we prove that it is NP-complete to decide whether for a given preference pro3le
an exchange stable matching exists. ? 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The classical stable roommates problem, introduced by Gale and Shapley in [3], is
motivated by a situation where a set of n male students are to be accommodated in a
college having only two-bed rooms. This means that each boy needs a roommate and
the assignment of boys to their roommates is called a matching. Gale and Shapley [3]
designed a criterion for desirability of such a matching: the matching is stable if it is
free of blocking pairs, i.e. pairs i; j of boys such that i prefers j to his current roommate
and similarly j prefers i to his current roommate. Blocking pairs are undesirable, since
their members would leave their roommates and form a new pair with each other.
Imagine however, that the number of boys is n and the number of rooms is exactly
n=2. If a pair of boys i; j prefers to be together instead of with their roommates, then
they would not be able to 3nd a free room. So the assumed instability will in fact not
occur, provided that everybody has to live somewhere. Such considerations were in
the background of a paper by Alcalde [1], who introduced a new concept of stability:
exchange-stability. A matching is exchange-stable, if there exists no pair of boys i; j,
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who could exchange their current roommates (which physically means that i moves
into j’s room and j into i’s one) so as to be better oJ.
There are several other situations where exchange-stability is probably more appro-
priate than the classical Gale–Shapley stability. Imagine e.g. members of a sports club,
organizing a canoeing expedition. There are n people and n=2 canoes for two. If some-
body does not like his paddling partner, he can either leave and not take part in the
trip, or 3nd somebody willing to switch partners. Another example can be n chess
players and n=2 chessboards, or n tennis players and n=2 courts etc.
In our model, there is one slight diJerence to the one introduced by Alcalde [1].
He supposed that each participant is acceptable to all the other participants, while we
consider also the possibility of unacceptable participants.
Relatively many results are known for the complexity of the stable marriage problem
and its extensions. A polynomial algorithm for its basic version has been devised
already by Gale and Shapley. For the case with ties, Irving [7] considered three versions
of stability (weak, strong and super-stability) and showed that all of them admit a
polynomial algorithm for deciding the existence question. However, when both ties
and incomplete preference lists are allowed, several NP-complete problems arise, see
[8,9].
For 3nding Gale–Shapley stable roommates, Irving [6] designed a polynomial algo-
rithm in case of strict preferences, see also Gus3eld and Irving [5]. However, if the
preferences of participants contain ties, Ronn [11] showed that the above problem is
NP-complete; another NP-completeness proof for this problem has been suggested by
Manlove in [10].
In this paper we prove a rather surprising result, that even for strict preferences the
problem to decide whether for a given preference pro3le an exchange-stable matching
exists, is NP-complete. It seems that in the area of matching theory usually ties are
‘responsible’ for NP-completeness; to the author’s knowledge only two hard problems
not involving ties are known: the hospitals-interns matching problem with couples [11]
and the three-dimensional matching problem [2].
2. Denitions
Let N = {1; 2; : : : ; n}; n even, be the set of participants. We suppose that each partic-
ipant i has a preference list P(i), which is a strictly linearly ordered subset of N \ {i}.
A participant j is acceptable for i if he appears in P(i), otherwise he is unacceptable.
If participant j is the 3rst one in i’s preference list, then he is called the i’s favourite,
if i and j are each other’s favourites, then they will be called for brevity twins.
A preference pro6le (P(1); P(2); : : : ; P(n)) will be denoted by P.
Denition 1. A matching M on N is a partition of N into pairs such that if {i; j}∈M
then i; j 3nd each other acceptable. If {i; j}∈M then we shall alternately write
pM (i)= j and call j the i’s mate.
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Denition 2. A matching M is exchange-blocked by a pair of participants i; j if i
prefers pM (j) to pM (i) and j prefers pM (i) to pM (j). A matching M is exchange-stable
if it is not exchange-blocked by any pair of participants.
Clearly, if {i; j}∈pM such that i; j are twins, then neither member of this pair will
participate in an exchange-blocking.
Alcalde in [1] showed that the Gale–Shapley stability and exchange-stability are inde-
pendent and there exist instanceswith no exchange-stablematching, e.g. the one given by
the following preference pro3le: P(1) : 2; 3; 4; P(2) : 4; 1; 3; P(3) : 1; 4; 2; P(4) : 3; 2; 1.
So there arises a very natural problem, which will be called the Exchange-stable
roommates problem (ESR for short): Given a preference pro6le P, does there exist
an exchange-stable matching?
3. ESR is NP-complete
The ESR problem clearly belongs to the class NP, since when an exchange-stable
matching is given, checking all pairs of participants veri3es this property. In this section
we demonstrate a polynomial transformation to ESR from the problem
Restricted 3-satisability (R3SAT). Given a boolean formula in conjunctive normal
form, with each clause containing at most three literals and each variable x occurring
at most twice as literal x and at most twice as literal Rx; decide whether there exists
such a truth assignment for the boolean variables that the formula becomes true.
The NP-completeness of R3SAT was proved in [5], see also [4, p. 259]. We shall
also suppose, without loss of generality, that no clause contains both a literal and its
negation, since such a clause would be satis3ed in any truth assignment.
For each instance of R3SAT with n variables x1; x2; : : : ; xn and m clauses C1; C2;
: : : ; Cm we construct a preference pro3le P.
For each clause Ci there will be one clause participant ui. For each variable xj







correspond to the 3rst and the second occurrence of the literals xj and Rxj in the formula,
respectively. These participants, called the x-participants, will be used for ensuring that
each clause will be satis3ed. They are de3ned even if the corresponding literals are
actually not present in the formula. If a literal appears in the formula once or twice,
the preference lists of the x1-participant and=or x2-participants contain the u-participant
corresponding to the clause which contains the respective literal. This will be considered
a function u of the literal, de3ned only if the literal in question appears in the formula.






j are called the y-participants and each one of them is a
twin of an x-participant with the same set of indices and bars. To make the following







will be said to form its true side and the four participants with the bar its false side.
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Table 1
Preferences of x- and y-participants
P(x1j )
















































j ; g( Ry
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aComment: function u is de3ned and this entry appears in the list only if the respective literal appears in
the formula.
The two participants with the same sub- and superscript, diJering only in the bar, like
x1j and Rx
1
j , will be called each other’s shadows.
Moreover, there will be one g-participant for each y-participant, denoted by g(y)
and called his father. Conversely, the y-participant will be the son of his father. If the
number of clauses m is odd, there will be one more g-participant, thus ensuring that
the total number of participants is even. Moreover, we suppose that there is a linear
ordering of the g-participants, which will enable us to write their list as g1; g2; : : : ; gk .
Now we are ready to de3ne the preference pro3le.
The preference lists of u-participants are as follows:











where the z-participants correspond to the x-participants, representing the 3rst, second
and third literal of clause Ci and the t-participants are twins of the shadows of the
z-participants. For example, suppose that the second clause C2 in the formula has the
form
C2 = x3 + Rx2 + x1;












If the clause Ci contains only two literals, then z3i and t
3
i are simply not de3ned and
they will not appear in the preference list of ui.
The preferences of participants in one family are given in Table 1.
Table 2 contains the preference lists of g-participants. The last row in Table 2
appears only if m is odd, when there is a g-participant without a son. Notice that these
preferences are identical, except for the four y-participants in the beginning of the










j ; g1; g2; : : : ; gk
P(g(y2j ))






j ; g1; g2; : : : ; gk
P(g( Ry1j))






j ; g1; g2; : : : ; gk
P(g( Ry2j))






j ; g1; g2; : : : ; gk
P(gk)b = g1; g2; : : : ; gk−1
aComment: participant g is not contained in his own preference list.
bComment: this participant exists only if m is odd.
list of each father and the g-participant himself not appearing in his own preference
list. These preferences are in fact cloned on G= {g1; : : : ; gk}; k =4n + (mmod 2), as
Alcalde [1] called this property.
Denition 3 (Alcalde [1]). Let H be a set of participants and ¡ a linear ordering on
N . We say that participant i’s preferences are cloned with respect to ¡, if for each
pair of participants j; k, participant i prefers j to k if and only if j¡k.
Theorem 1 (Alcalde [1]). If there exists a linear ordering ¡ on N such that prefer-
ences of each participant of N are cloned with respect to ¡; then there exists an
exchange-stable matching on N .
We shall use this result later in our construction of an exchange-stable matching.
Before we formulate the main result of this paper, we shall derive some properties
of exchange-stable matchings for the de3ned preference pro3le.
First, the u-participants can be matched only with the x-participants correspond-
ing to literals contained in the respective clauses and not with y-participants, since
u-participants are for y-participants unacceptable. Further, all the participants from
one family can be matched only within this family, with only two exceptions: some
y-participants can be matched with g-participants, namely with their fathers and some
x-participants can be matched to suitable u-participants. In the following we shall show
that the former case can occur for at most one y-participant in a family and the latter
for at most two x-participants of a family, moreover, contained in the same side of the
family.
Lemma 1. Let M be an exchange-stable matching. Then in one family at most one
y-participant can be M -matched with a g-participant; namely with his father.
Proof. Clearly, for each y-participant the only acceptable g-participant is his father.
However, if any two y-participants of one family were matched with their fathers,
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the fathers would bene3t from exchanging their sons, since each g-participant prefers
to his son all the other y-participants of his son’s family.
Lemma 2. Let M be an exchange-stable matching. Then it is impossible to have in
one family all x-participants matched with acceptable u-participants.
Proof. If all the x-participants of a family were matched to the u-participants, then the
y-participants have to be matched to other y-participants in the same family or to their
fathers. Due to Lemma 1, at most one of them can be matched to his father, but if one
is, then the number of remaining y-participants is three and they cannot be matched.
If no y-participant is matched to his father, then the only possible matching on the
four y-participants is pM (y1j )=y
2




j, this is however exchange-blocked by
the pair {y1j ; Ry1j}.
Lemma 3. Let M be an exchange-stable matching. Then it is impossible to have
exactly three x-participants in one family matched with acceptable u-participants.
Proof. If exactly three x-participants from one family are matched with u-participants,
then the fourth one has to be matched to his twin. Then we shall look at the remaining
three y-participants and their possibilities for 3nding suitable mates. Distinguish two
cases (other situations are symmetric to those considered):




j are left. Then, since exactly one of these players has to be matched
to his father and Ry1j is for y
2





pM ( Ry1j)= g( Ry
1








j ). In the former case the pair
{y1j ; g( Ry1j)} and in the latter the pair { Ry1j; g(y2j )} are exchange-blocking.




j are left. Now, since neither of the other two participants is for Ry
2
j
acceptable, the only possibility is to have pM (y1j )=y
2





is however exchange-blocked by the pair {g( Ry2j); y1j }.
The previous lemmas imply that in one family at most two x-participants can be
matched to their u-participants. Now we show that those two participants have to be
from the same side of the family.
Lemma 4. Let M be an exchange-stable matching. Then it is impossible to have
in one family two x-participants from the opposite sides matched to acceptable
u-participants.
Proof. Wealready know that atmost two x-participants can be matched to u-participants.
Now suppose w.l.o.g. that pM (x1j )= u(x
1
j ) and distinguish two cases.
1. pM ( Rx1j )= u( Rx
1




j have to be matched to their twins (Lem-
mas 2 and 3) and since both Ry1j; y
1
j cannot be matched to their fathers (Lemma 1),
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the only possibility is to have pM (y1j )= Ry
1
j, which is however exchange-blocked by
the pair {u(x1j ); y1j }.
2. pM ( Rx2j )= u( Rx
2




j have to be matched to their twins (Lemmas 2
and 3) and since both Ry2j; y
1
j cannot be matched to their fathers (Lemma 1), the
only possibility would be to match them together, but y1j is not acceptable for Ry
2
j.
Now we can formulate the theorem
Theorem 2. A restricted boolean formula is satis6able if and only if for the cor-
responding preference pro6le there exists an exchange-stable matching. Hence; the
ESR problem is NP-complete.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a satisfying truth assignment TA for the given formula.
We shall de3ne on its basis a matching M of the set of participants and then show that
it is exchange-stable. First, match each clause participant ui with the x-participant corre-
sponding to the 3rst true literal in clause Ci under TA. It can happen, that in one family,
either both x-participants from one side will be matched with the u-participants, or only
one of them, or none. In the 3rst case match the twins of the two x-participants together
and in the second one match the twin (i.e. an y-participant) of the x-participant matched
to a u-participant to his father g-participant. All the remaining x- and y-participants
will be matched to their twins. Of the g-participants, the number of those matched to
y-participants is unknown, it is only clear that their parity is equal to the parity of the
number of clauses, m. Hence the number of so far unmatched g-participants is even
and we match them according to some exchange-stable matching, which, since their
preferences are cloned, exists due to the Theorem 1.
We have to show that the matching M just de3ned is exchange-stable. Clearly,
in each pair the participants are mutually acceptable and to show that there is no
exchange-blocking pair, we shall successively consider all types of participants.
No x-participant will participate in any exchange-blocking pair, since he is either
with his twin y, or with his second choice u. However, if x wanted to give up u for
getting his twin y, no possible partner of y would cooperate, since the u participants
are acceptable only for x-participants.





j is similar), whom he can only oJer to his twin y
1
j . Due to the properties of
exchange-stable matchings for the de3ned preference pro3le, the u-participant would
bene3t from such an exchange only if the mate of y1j , whom he would receive, is
acceptable for u. This is only the case if pM (y1j )=y
2
j . But this would mean that the
clause corresponding to u contains both literals xj and Rxj, which we excluded from
considerations.
A y-participant can be either with his twin, or with his father or with the other
y-participant from the same side of his family. In the 3rst case he cannot be better
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oJ, in the second one he can oJer his father only to another g-participant. However,
due to Lemma 1, no other g-participant is matched to a member of his family, so y
would not bene3t from such an exchange. If y is matched to another y, then he would
like to receive either his twin x, or a y participant from another side of his family. In
the former case, the twin x is matched to a u-participant and the u-participant would
not exchange x for the other y-participant from the same side of the family unless the
corresponding clause contains a literal as well as its negation, which does not occur.
In the latter case, the remaining y-participants in the family are matched to their twins,
who would not participate in such an exchange.
An exchange among g-participants is impossible due to the construction of the match-
ing. If a g-participant wanted a y-participant in exchange for his g-mate, then possi-
ble partners of the y-participant (namely y’s father) would not bene3t from such an
exchange. A g-participant could oJer a y-participant (namely his son) for a better
y-participant (namely for another y in the family of his son) only in the case when
all the other y’s in his son’s family are with their twins, thus unavailable.
Hence, the constructed matching is exchange-stable.
For the converse implication, i.e. de3ning a satisfying truth assignment based on an
exchange-stable matching, we shall also use the properties derived above.
Lemmas 1–4 ensure that if some x-participants from a family are matched with
u-participants, then they may only come from the same side of the family. Therefore
it will be consistent to de3ne the boolean values of the variables in the formula in
the following way: xj will be true if at least one x-participant from the true side of
the family corresponding to variable xj is matched to his u-participant and xj will
be false if at least one x-participant from the false side of this family is matched to
his u-participant. If some variables are not assigned the boolean value this way, they
can be arbitrary. Moreover, since each clause participant ui has to be matched to an
x-participant corresponding to a literal contained in Ci, it is easy to see that this is a
satisfying truth assignment.
4. Conclusion and open problems
Notice that our proof relies heavily on incompleteness and inconsistency of the
preference lists of the participants. Would the ESR problem with complete and=or
consistent preference lists remain NP-complete?
Let us also notice that for the stable marriage problem exchange-stability is also
a plausible notion. However, also in this case there exist instances which admit no
exchange-stable matching. Let us e.g. consider the following instance with two men
m1; m2, two women w1; w2 and preferences de3ned by
P(m1): w1; w2; P(w1): m2; m1;
P(m2): w2; w1; P(w2): m1; m2:
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There are only two possible matchings, M1 = {(m1; w1); (m2; w2)} and M2 = {(m1; w2);
(m2; w1)}. The former is exchange-blocked by the two women and the latter by the
two men. The computational complexity of the exchange-stable marriage problem has
not been studied so far.
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